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1. Science, technologies and institutions
1 Last November, when the various Nobel prizes in the scientific field were awarded, two
out of three, those for physics and chemistry, were acknowledging significant technical
breakthroughs  through  the  application  of  scientific  principles,  rather  than  scientific
advances per se. A sign of the times, we may think, in a market-orientated, technology-
driven  age  which  prizes  practical  performance  above  all  else.  There  is  a  certain
connection between this story and the dynamics of today’s legal and institutional fields in
Europe. In modern continental European tradition, law was usually defined and organized
as “legal science”1, and the dogmatic tradition, with its abstract categories and general
concepts,  has built  the necessary tool-box for the working of an “axiomatic” method
based on logical deductions derived from “dogmas”2.  One of the things this scientific
concept implied above all was the idea that for each and every problem requiring a legal
answer  there  could  be  one  only  right  solution.  Within  this  schema,  the  actual  legal
techniques  used  were  at  the  service  of  legal  science,  they  merely  represented  the
necessary steps required to reach that “unique” legal solution.
2 This scientific view of law was challengeable on many levels and could be seen even as an
ideology intended to hidden the political substance underlying legal decisions. In any
case, it was prevailing in Continental Europe. Moreover, its siren call was even felt in the
United States, when Langdell tried to apply the scientific model to the American legal
scenario, introducing the case method in Harvard law school teaching. In his vision, court
decisions were the “specimens” from which general  principles could be induced,  and
legal  case  books  had  to  be  representative  of  the  set  of  court  decisions. Apart  from
Langdell’s case method, the scientific idea of law never managed to conquer the American
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mind, where law is perceived directly as a technique, a means to an end, rather than a
science. Law is a problem-solving tool and legal reasoning is addressed mainly to reach an
end, a scenario in which a plurality of legal solutions become possible for each problem,
conflict or doubt. This plurality of legal solutions, together with a plurality of paths to
achieve them (see below) is a central point for understanding the common law system: as
noted by S.  Cassese,  the case law method used in the USA in teaching and research,
maintains “the idea that each issue can be solved in many ways”3. On the contrary, in
Germany, where case law is also frequently used, in a situation of “systemic perfection”
and consistency, the idea is that there is just one right solution for each legal problem.
3 Despite  the fact  that  these contrasts  between one legal  system and another are still
evident, current legal evolution appears to be shifting decidedly from the scientific view
that was typical  of  Continental  Europe,  towards looser forms of legal  techniques and
practises, unbound by any overall “scientific” framework. In this trend, we can see an
influence  of  the  common  law  tradition,  where  law  has  always  been  perceived  as  a
technical  instrument;  one to be used for different  purposes and by different  actors4,
without posing too many problems of scientific consistency. Problems of consistency are
solved with other means, and especially through a procedural principle as the stare decisis
is. 
4 But this shift was not only the result of American cultural influence. Something new has
happened over the last few decades, as law was increasingly called upon to deal with
“techno-economics”, that becomes “itself normative and wants to determine the content
of law”5.
5 In sketching the rise and diffusion of the idea and operation of law as a technical tool
over these last few decades in Europe, but also at an international and trans-national
level, I will try to deal with this subject in practical rather than in theoretical and abstract
terms. I will try to show how some legal “reforms” were often realised without the benefit
of  political  process,  how  this  was  achieved  and  the  ideas  and  theories  that  were
influential  along  this  transformative  path  from  science  to  “technique”.  Of  course,
although this trend is  important,  it  is  by no means unique.  It  would be difficult,  for
example, to include the important and burgeoning field of human rights law into this
matrix of the growing technicalization of law.
 
2. The changing European legal scene: law as a
technique without science
6 With  the  birth  of  modern  States  legislative  law  triumphed  in  Continental  Europe,
superseding the Medieval  practise of  law springing from the mores and traditions of
social and economic life ( 6 ): legislation conveyed political will inspired by the idea of
“public interest” or “intérêt general” into “norms” with “general and abstract” characters,
resembling the idea of a “political theology”, as C. Schmitt claimed7. The idea of “law as
science” in Europe grew side by side with this  political  identity of  law.  Law,  in this
scientific, rational guise, thus neutralised the risk of political interference: its “scientific”
application meant results were inevitably predictable and “calculable”. As Max Weber
observed, this form of “rational” law matched the legal requirements of capitalism, better
than,  for  example,  common  law,  with  its  “kadì  justice”,  seen  as  arbitrary  and  not
“rational”8. 
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7 Legislation entailed a sort of standardization of legal reasoning, thus protecting it from
the  pressure  of  particularistic  interests,  special  circumstances,  or  cultural  attitudes
typical of different contexts, as had been typical of the past, and especially of medieval
times. This rigidity was not due so much to the impossibility of interpreting the same
legal norm in different ways, but rather to a complex doctrinal web that was reasonably
successful in preserving unitary legal semantics, in order to maintain the idea of a single
solution for each legal case. This legislative rigidity was entirely alien to the American
legal mind, used to seeing law mostly as “law in action” rather than “law in books”.
Judge-made law is the lone star of the American legal system, that prizes its flexibility
and social manoeuvrability; “drift” rather than “direction” lies at the root of its legal
tradition9. 
8 The question is: is Weber’s scenario of (legislative) law, still the fittest for the purpose of
responding to the needs of today’s capitalism? Law and the legal discourse have changed
dramatically with the process of globalization, which has led to a tendency to reform
institutions  typical  of  the  European  tradition.  These  changes  have  been  even  more
marked in Europe than in the rest of the West, because modern European law was mainly
based on legislation, a legislation which proved not only impracticable at the global level,
but also less popular than it was in the past. Statutes, as “general and abstract” legal
measures, became the polemical target of new all-conquering neo-liberal doctrines and
programmes whose hegemony was gradually established in Europe, as elsewhere, from
the 1980s onward.
9 This key change followed patterns sketched in particular by the doctrines of law and
economics,  and of  so-called economic neo-institutionalism:  two very learned schools,
which wrought profound changes on the legal landscape with their new insights and
perspectives, generating an impressive literature. Both these doctrines were concerned
with  discussing  the  role  played  by  legal  institutions  in  economic  life:  “institutions
matter” rose the cry from neo-institutionalist scholars. However, the importance of law
was seen by both of them as strictly linked to its working as a way for reaching economic
efficiency. And both of them, on the other hand, stressed the idea that legislation was
unfit for purpose in terms of efficiency. In order to achieve economic efficiency, law’s
contribution was important, but a type of law that differed from legislation.
10 So the Chicago School reversed the Weberian view, popularising the idea that common
law alone (i.e.  judge-made law,  not statute law) was efficient.  As noted by Bachkaus,
Richard Posner built a legal doctrine, primarily in the field of American civil law, “on the
hypothesis that it can be described and taught as if it had been designed with economic
efficiency in mind”10. Statute law, on the contrary, is deemed inefficient because it tends
to  generate  large  transaction costs.  All  these  ideas,  however  “general  and abstract”,
become very popular. Contrasting them was difficult but not impossible. Michelman, for
example, was able to show that if inefficient legal rules can approach efficiency through
litigation, this can be achieved both under a common law system and a civil law system11.
Michelman’s  argument  weakened  the  idea  of  the  superiority  of  common  law,  and
underlined the idea that judicial rulemaking, independent of the particular legal culture
in which a judge acts, can be a means to achieve efficiency.
11 Neo-institutionalist  literature  preached the  idea  of  the  inefficiency  of  legislative  law
because of its centralism. As suggested by Williamson, Nobel Prize 2009 for Economics,
legal centralism is unfit to achieve efficiency12. The literature on transaction costs has
generally upheld the idea that even typical contractual forms and judicial process are
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unfit for achieving efficiency, whereas atypical legal forms, especially in the contractual
field, perform much better. What is needed are legal solutions à la carte13: as suggested by
Williamson,  instead  of  predicting  in  advance  all  the  possible  legal  solutions,  it  is
preferable to leave people and companies free to choose the solutions at the moment. Not
uniform legal measures and solutions but a plurality of devices and “alternative” legal
solutions.
12 These very influential schools achieved two very important results. On the one hand, they
were very successful in making efficiency, an economic credo, not a new legal theory, the
new engine of law, and the most important principle of guidance for legal change. On the
other hand, the link with efficiency was a way to give rise to more depoliticized and
privatized legal means. Legal changes called in the name of “economic efficiency” could
be seen almost as a new form of social justice, because “efficiency” was defined by Posner
as “wealth maximizing” and, as such, it was presented as able to spread its positive effects
all over the different parts of societies (Posner 1981, Hofstra Law Review Symposium 1,
11 1980).  So,  law was  becoming  more  and  more  similar  to  a  very  rich  collection  of
(technical) tools, each able give an answer, to solve a problem, or to provide a service,
with beneficial effects on social life, following a “trickle down” logic.
 
3. Exit strategies from State law
13 Today’s legal scene seems to confirm the opposite of what Weber predicted: a growing de-
formalization of law and its paraphernalia. Indeed, along the process of globalization we
witnessed an enlargement of the idea of “legal sources” intended as something controlled
by states and with clear state borders. Also the public law/private law distinction was
trespassed upon and blurred in many ways. We could speak of a significant process of
legal liberalization that parallels the process of economic liberalization.
14 Along this new path of legal liberalization that has put forward a large number of legal
tools, the European idea of a “legal science”, with its “dogmatic” certainties and a single,
“exact” legal solution for each problem, was facing a serious challenge. Its dogmatic tool-
box  was  unable  to  provide  this  variety  of  legal  tools  and  solutions  with  a  common
language  and  semantics,  thus  increasingly  losing  its  credibility.  This  makes  hardly
practicable any hypothesis of re-founding a European legal science, starting from law
teaching, as emerging from Bogdandy’s recent learned project14.  However, sketching a
new kind of dogmatic attitude, open to inputs coming from economic and social life, such
a project is threatened by the multiplicity and decentralization of legal means an sources
that Europe can’t avoid.
15 So we now find ourselves with an increasing body of private, rather than public, law
outlined by private subjects; “atypical” rather than typical contracts and legal tools and
institutional  formulas:  arbitration  houses  and  centres  of  mediation  and  conciliation
rather  than  courts,  forum  shopping  and  legal  solutions  à  la  carte rather than  pre-
established public courts and jurisdictions. Both individuals and companies are at liberty
to pick and choose their own legal solutions, with few public constraints and controls,
limited purely by the size of their bank balance. The large variety of legal options, able to
satisfy different needs and tastes, and frequently moulded “from below” was a sort of
“exit  strategy”  from the  uniqueness  of  legislation,  through a  panoply  of  varied  and
flexible  instruments,  ready  to  be  used  in  different  ways  and  possibly  in  an
“entrepreneurial” way15. In this scenario we are far from any idea of transcendence, or
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the dogmatic character of law: this is the rise of a “now and here” principle in legal
development.
16 Thus, instead of a hypothesized legal science with normative character, we are witnessing
a new form of technicalization of law, that is to say a closer link between the specificity of
any legal measure and the particular aim that it pursues. Today the technicalization of
law no longer addresses a standardization of legal responses. On the contrary, because
efficiency is the new recurrent goal of legal tools, what is required is a “fit for purpose”
law, with great plurality of guises, possibilities and solutions. One can see essentially two
paths that have led to this new form of “fit for purpose” legal attitude: a return to the
ancient  concept  of  customs  and legal  traditions  and a  re-invention  of  existing  legal
devices as conceived by States16.
17 On the one hand there are legal solutions that seem to echo the past, and that can be
efficaciously synthesized in Holsti’s words as “Hidden hands, habits, patterned behaviour,
and cultural mores”17. Old legal practises, and even pre-modern legal practises, such as
customs, usages, legal traditions and lex mercatoria, are enjoying a renewed lease on life,
once again separately from states and any political identity. On the other hand, we can
observe a diffusion of legal means that are an imitation and re-production, in different
forms, of traditional state legal devices. There was especially a multiplication of types of
contract and judicial formulas as opposed to uniform legal measures and solutions;  a
plurality of devices and “alternative” legal solutions. The Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) movement that conquered the scene during the 1980s and 90s, first in the U.S. and
subsequently in Europe, was emblematic of this tendency.
 
4. How did Europe deal with this global change?
European governance and its legal strategy
18 Europe proved fairly enthusiastic in building institutions for a “New World”. And in doing
so it significantly contributed to partly changing the path of its political and institutional
history. The so-called knowledge economy, envisaged by the Lisbon Strategy proclaimed
in 2000 sounded very promising: “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs
and greater social cohesion" was to dominate post-industrial European society by 2010.
The Commission’s famous “White Paper” on governance was intended “to refocus policies
and institutions on clear objectives”, and “renew the Community method by following a
less top-down approach and complementing its policy tools more effectively with non-
legislative instruments”18.
19 This climate of growing expectations and enthusiasm contributed to increasing respect
for  technological  expertise and trust  in technocracy to the point  of  characterizing a
special kind of European governance. Fifteen years later much of this bright future is
merely  a  tarnished  memory,  and  many  of  those  promises  made  in  the  name  of
technological innovation are sadly forgotten. Europe is struggling with an apparently
endless series of social and economic crises, with Italy all too frequently jockeying for
position at the bottom of the league tables when it comes to performance.
20 The acceptance of the governance formula was perfectly functional to the building of the
European Union,  but  also  influent  in  changing the  institutional  and political  face  of
Europe. What was so revolutionary in the governance processes? On the one hand, legally
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the  idea  of  “governance”  was  challenging  especially  for  the  most  recent  legislative
history of Europe. On the other hand, politically it was realized through a technocracy as
a partial substitute for political leadership, along the unification process. Let us sketch
these two main processes.
21 When  we  speak  of  governance,  the  involvement  of  private  subjects  in  the  (public)
decision-making process, is probably the most remarkable and notorious aspect. But that
is  not  all.  Much  more  is  at  stake.  This  concept  of  governance  breaks  some  further
important  characters  that  were  typical  of  the  modern political  and  legal  system.  In
particular,  the  notions  of  “territory”  and  “people”,  two  constitutive  aspects  of  the
modern states, are bypassed by governance processes, that each creates its own “people”
and “territory”, tailored to ever changing specific needs and situations.
22 In order to reconstruct a “genealogy”, or a history of governance, we can start with the
realm of corporations, where the idea of “corporate governance” first appeared, and the
field of international relations, where a situation of “governance without government”
was first discovered and analyzed19. But if we think of governance as an innovative rift of
the government model, the place to start is Great Britain, traditionally characterized by
the “Westminster model”, that is by the pre-eminence of Parliament: it enthusiastically
embraced the idea of “re-inventing government”20, and sophisticatedly theorized the idea
of  governance21 .  Of  course,  when  we  say  that  Great  Britain  can  be  considered  the
homeland of European governance, we have to bear in mind that governance style draws
liberally on British and American paradigms and models. We might state that forms of
proto-governance have always been alive in the United States,  through common law
channels and a wide participation of private actors in many institutional mechanisms22.
23 Notwithstanding the fact  that  governance was  a  “soft  revolution”,  especially  for  the
European tradition, it had concrete legal and political effects23 . If we think of Europe in a
political sense, governance increases the crisis of representative democracy, because it
posits interests in the centre of the scene. So governance breaks with any unitary idea of
representation and opens the doors to many forms of self-representation of interests,
giving legitimacy to lobbies and lobbyism.  Not only can interest  groups,  professional
associations, and companies speak in the name of their interests, but even single people
can try,  for example in a judicial  or quasi-judicial  trial,  to represent a more general
interest  which touches  their  single  cases.  We could say that  governance implies  the
continuous creation of ever-new decision-making scenarios, almost a travelling theatre,
which  assembles  its  scenes  in  different  ways  and  with  different  actors  for  each
performance. At the same time, this “theatre” largely relinquishes the “public” character
that was the hallmark of state institutions, and largely celebrated by Bagehot as being
typical of the British Parliament.
24 If we think of Europe in a legal sense, we discover a new legal strategy which addresses
the need for flexibility evidenced, in particular, by the market. So governance goes in the
same  direction  as  the  rise  of  legal  tools  and  practises  which  transcend  or  by  pass
legislation. Indeed, contracts and judge-made law are both very effective legal ways of
governance,  so  that  we  can  also  speak  of  “judicial  governance”  and  “contractual
governance”24.  In  other  words,  contracts  and  judge-made  law become not  only  very
frequently used legal  tools,  but also ways for solving problems that politics does not
consider. This situation has been frequently presented as one of “juridification” or of
“judicialization” of the political sphere.
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25 Here we see not only a new form of surrogacy of politics by law, but also a meaningful
transformation of the legal rationality of subjects involved in legal operations,  which
switch from a “parametric” model to a “strategic” model, to use the language of game
theory25. What does a “strategic” or “parametric” use of law mean? What does it imply in
terms of “legal rationality” for actors involved in legal dynamics?
 
5. Governance, language and ‘strategic’ legal attitudes
26 Contract law and judge-made law might be thought of as two heirs sharing the legacy of
legislation, dispersing the abstractness and generality of rules as well as the “theological”
character of law envisaged by Carl Schmitt. Inspired by the ‘here and now’ principle, they
no longer come from ‘elsewhere’, and are far removed from any form of transcendence
and dogmatism. They are, on the contrary, merely a product of the actions of competing
individuals,  corporations,  groups  and  even  states  motivated  by  specific  goals  and
interests,  although within boundaries dictated by laws and general  principles of  law.
Above all, judicial and contract law have become crucial in today’s world for their ability
to adapt in a twofold way to the ongoing tendency towards privatization. On the one
hand, they provide an important role to private subjects, albeit each in different ways. On
the other, both are capable of promoting and satisfying the ‘legal entrepreneurship’ of
subjects, something typical of American history, that corresponds to the economic trend
that global capitalism has forced onto institutions.
27 The transposition of  the ‘language of  interest’  into legal  relations happens above all
through the growing importance of contract and judicial law, which assign a direct role to
actors in shaping legal rules, and reward their dynamism and interactive abilities26. In
other words, it might be said that judge-made law and contractual dynamics both make
use of what J. Elster calls “the language of negotiation”27, which is typical of ‘strategic’
forms of action. In a way, when actors behave strategically, they no longer obey law as a
‘command’. On the contrary, they are encouraged to act so as to use legal means and
occasions (opinions, courts, arbitral awards, contracts, etc...) instrumentally, in order to
produce results in line with their own aims, that is, the maximization of utility and the
satisfaction of their own interests.
28 So, we can say, referring to game theory language, that the rules of governance are no
longer supported by a ‘parametric rationality’ but by a ‘strategic rationality’. This regards
people acting in competitive situations, each one trying to guess the moves of the others
in response to their own. In fact, each actor is pursuing his own purposes through a
competitive interaction (or game) with the other parts. As is known, such ‘games’ even
contemplate the possibility that individuals resort to ‘threats’, misrepresentations, false
statements and other strategies that belong to the repertoire of war in order to challenge
the counterpart and eventually win. Rules are the result of these competitive contexts.
29 While legislative law was supposed to offer a single,  coherent solution,  a unique and
generalized answer to any specific problem or social demand, the rules emerging from
contracts and court decisions are strongly influenced by the competitive environment
that generates them and by the skills and strategic capabilities of the parties taking part
in the competition. They represent contingent and particular responses that cannot be
immediately generalized and may not be immediately applicable to different situations.
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Strategic  rationality  also  affects  public  law,  which  is  again  drawn  towards  strategic
models of action and subjected to economic analysis. 
30 The emphasis  on actors’  strategic  attitudes,  especially  in  the  context  of  judicial  and
contractual governance, implies a strong depletion of the normative horizon of law. The
notion itself of legality, mostly deprived of the guiding role of legislation, becomes today
more  than ever  a  ‘myth’.  This  is  especially  true  with  reference  to  the  international
scenario, where states and other various international structures are engaged, within a
contractual framework, in collaborating and competing with one another. Consequently,
the notion of legality is subject to challenges and forms of exploitation while performing
functions that limit power in the name of rights. The crucial role played by interests and
the shift towards strategic rationality may seem to contradict the constitutional shift that
characterizes our time. Yet rights and interests are the great combination buttressing the
political and institutional organization based on governance28. The imbalance between
these two components also represents the imbalance between normative and strategic
attitude in current legal relations.
31 Weber’s prediction that capitalism needs a "complete calculability of the functioning of
public administration and law” as a condition to ensure "the highest degree of formal
calculability" now seems distant indeed29 . On the contrary, it is in a spectrum of highly
differentiated  choices,  methods,  practices  and  legal  possibilities,  in  accordance  with
different  interests,  criteria  and  rationalities,  that  today’s  capitalism  builds  its  legal
language and shops for its legal solutions.
 
6. European governance through technocracy
32 When the European Union officially embraced the strategic step of governance it also
created its  own  form  of  governance  through  technocracy,  nicely  nicknamed
“comitology”. It is somewhat paradoxical that it was Europe, the place where modern
politics was invented, that delegated so much to technocracy: that is to say a form of rule
by expertise.  Technical  expertise  is  a  tried and tested way of  providing solutions  to
problems in given fields, following supposedly scientific criteria. We could say, in fact,
that European technocracy is expertise “at the top” rather than expertise “on tap”, as it
should be. Of course expertise is a precious source of knowledge and a “necessary evil” in
today’s  world:  we could not live without its  precious services,  but although it  is  the
solution to many problems, it also raises issues still to be resolved. What Rathenau called
“the mechanization of  the world” produces  results  both good and bad,  it  surrogates
human drudgery, but weakens basic skills.  Its rapid progress alleviates labour on one
hand but creates unemployment on the other. Electronic devices make many aspects of
our daily life much easier, but undermine our privacy. Automation helps do things but
weakens capabilities, for example in calculation, and even in writing. And so on.
33 But it  is  when expertise takes over “at  the top” that  it  raises  questions and creates
problems  of  democratic  accountability,  without  necessarily  delivering  perfect
technological decision-making. Technocracy seems very promising, because in the name
of knowledge it portrays itself not only as a sort of automatic provider of solutions, but
also a guarantee of correct solutions. Yet, at the same time, it claims legitimacy purely
through the possession of expert technical knowledge and skills, and differently from
politics,  is  a  type of  power that  is  presumed to be above public  scrutiny.  This  calm
assumption  of  authority  by  expertise  at  the  top  leads  to  a  potentially  dangerous
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perception of  it  as  a  form of  automatic  truth,  almost  by  default.  This  highlights  its
dichotomy with politics,  which represents itself  as the reign of  conflict  of  one party
against another one, and the reign of choice and decision. Technocracy, on the contrary,
assumes that it has no enemies because “scientific” truth can have no enemy, nor can it
be discretionary,  as  it  is.  Moreover,  technocrats  have another marked characteristic:
because true expertise is assumed to be in scarce supply, they appear as a restricted,
elitist group dominating a closed market.  They resemble a sort of club, an oligarchy,
distant from popular opinion, which admits only the very favoured few, and is immune
from democratic pressures.
34 These  few  observations  on  a  theme  which  is  both  vast  and  complex,  boasting  an
extensive, specialized literature, are merely the preamble to a general warning: However
unavoidable expertise and technocracy may appear, they both need to be kept under
observation, together with all the ambivalences they generate. Thus, at this point, the
question “Why did Europe opt for technocracy?” seems to both make sense and await an
answer.
35 As said before, a European Union administered by a technocratic form of governance “not
designed for political accountability”30 is something of a paradox. With the Council and
the Commission, institutions which undoubtedly suffer from a certain democratic deficit,
European governance bestowed a major role on technocracy; using expertise as a lever
for increasing the legitimacy of the European decision-making process, given the role of
its institutions as regulatory bodies. There was therefore a logic of surrogacy working at a
political level in the building of Europe. Indeed, Weiler has lately spoken of a “political
messianism”  in  Europe,  aimed at  mobilizing  forces  and  political  energies  around  a
“Promised Land” waiting at the end of the road, an attitude that happily co-existed with
an institutional framework that was formal, elaborate yet substantially apolitical31 .
36 From a comparative perspective it  is  interesting to see that,  as  suggested by Martin
Shapiro, the European choice of technocracy was very different from its U.S. counterpart.
In the New Deal the United States celebrated the prestige of a new technocracy familiarly
known as the “egg heads”, but it was a technocracy which exercised its functions under
the  strong  political  guidance  of  Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt.  Moreover,  the  high-level
experts who came to dominate American bureaucracy were confronted by widespread
judicial suspicion and supervision. The attrition between the two acted as a spur to the
reform of American administrative law32,  through a sequence of litigation embodying
“the clash of opposing experts offered by government and interest groups”. American
administrative law was moulded in a way that allowed some form of public scrutiny on
the choices made by technocrats. Most importantly, disagreements and conflicts between
technical experts working either for government or for interest groups were examined in
court,  and  so  the  scarcity  of  objectivity  in  the  choices  made  and  presented  as
“technological” was clearly revealed. The judicial forum became a theatrical mise en scene
worthy of Molière.
37 In the EU, on the contrary, experts and committees “were subject to no administrative
law and no judicial review”33. This act of faith in technocratic legitimacy as a substitute
for democratic legitimacy was prompted by at least two factors. First of all it took shape
against a background of general weakness in political direction and power. Moreover,
“comitology” became almost a distinctive characteristic of the EU, conveying the image
of a plural scenario, crowded by many minds incorporating not only technical expertise,
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but also shared ethics and professional creeds, as suggested by the concept of “epistemic
communities”34. 
38 If there is a logic of surrogacy with a technocracy working at the political level, it is
hardly surprising to see this logic of surrogacy replicated at a legal level, as with the role
played by law as a substitute for political choices, especially but not only through the
European Court of Justice, that has been a true protagonist of the unification process with
its judge-made law, and has designed the most important chapters in the tale of global
“judicial governance”. But this is another story!
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ABSTRACTS
The article tries to show how Europe, from the 80s of last century, was involved in deep legal and
political  changes,  under  the  influence  especially  of  Law  &  economics,  and  economic  neo-
institutionalist  doctrines.  Governance  and  technocracy  became  its  ways  of  “re-inventing”
government,  and  efficiency  became  the  new  aim  of  law.  So,  through  a  path  of  growing
technicalization “without science”, law became a collection of “fit for purpose” instruments. Now
we are before an increasing body of private law and legal solutions à la carte, and “atypical”
contracts, legal tools, and institutional formulas: arbitration houses rather than courts; forum
shopping rather than pre-established public courts and jurisdictions. While Weber hypothesized
the “rational” and “abstract” legislative law as the fittest for the needs of capitalism, today’s
Europe and Institutional Change. Law: from science to “fit for purpose”?
Économie et institutions, 23 | 2015
11
capitalism  asks  for  the  opposite:  very  differed  legal  means  and  answers,  tailored  on  the
specificity of situations.
L’article essaie de montrer comment l’Europe, à partir des années 1980, a été engagée dans de
profonds  changements  juridiques  et  politiques  sous  l’influence,  en  particulier,  des  doctrines
Law&  Economics  et  des  doctrines  économiques  néoinstitutionalistes.  Gouvernance  et
technocratie  sont  devenues  ses  façons  de  « réinventer »  le  gouvernement  et  l’efficacité  est
devenue le but principal du droit. Ainsi, à travers un sentier de technicisation « sans science » le
droit est devenu une collection d’instruments « adaptés à l’objectif ». Nous sommes maintenant
face  à  un  corps  croissant  de  droit  privé  et  de  solutions  juridiques  à  la  carte,  de  contrats
atypiques,  d’outils  juridiques et de formules institutionnelles :  maisons d’arbitrage plutôt que
tribunaux,  forum-shopping  plutôt  que  juridictions  et  tribunaux publics  préétablis.  Alors  que
Weber  avait  fait  l’hypothèse  d’un  droit  législatif  « rationnel »  et  « abstrait »,  comme  le  plus
adapté aux besoins du capitalisme, le capitalisme d’aujourd’hui demande l’inverse : des réponses
et des moyens juridiques très différenciés, adaptés à la spécificité des situations.
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